Ghosts of debt and jobs will haunt economy
The Irish Times - Tuesday, December 29, 2009
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2009/1229/1224261354227.html
Morgan Kelly
OPINION : By 2015, Iceland will almost certainly be a lot better off than Ireland because it dealt decisively with its banks.

For grand corruption, though, we will have to look to Nama. By allowing the banks to dictate the terms of their bailout, the bank rescue was turned into the most lucrative and audacious Tiger Kidnapping in the history of the State, with the difference that, like the sheriff in Blazing Saddles, the bankers held themselves hostage.

Bad banks like Nama were tried on a large scale in the early 1930s in the US, Austria and Germany; and proved to be profoundly corrupt and corrupting institutions, whose primary purpose was to funnel money to politically connected businesses. The German bank is best remembered for setting up what we would now call a special purpose vehicle to fund the presidential election campaign of the odious Paul Hindenberg.

Bad banks do not just happen to be corrupt and anti-democratic institutions, it is what they are designed to be. Effectively, bad banks give governments the power to choose which of a country’s most powerful oligarchs will be forced into bankruptcy, and which will be resuscitated to emerge even more powerful than before.

Nama will get to pick which of the fattest hogs of Irish development will be sliced up and fed, at taxpayer expense, to better connected hogs (remember that Nama has been allocated at least €6.5 billion, considerably more than the Government saved by draconian budget cuts, to “lend” to favoured clients).

While Nama may have momentous political consequences, it has already failed economically: the Irish banks are still zombies, reliant on transfusions of European Central Bank funding to survive until losses on mortgages and business loans finally wipe them out. In the next few months we will discover if the State bankrupts itself by nationalising the banks; or if it has the intelligence to free itself from bank losses by turning the foreign creditors of banks into their owners, as Iceland has just done with Kaupthing bank.

It is ironic that by 2015, having devalued its currency and dealt decisively with its banks, Iceland will almost certainly be a lot better off than Ireland.

Why the eurozone has a tough decade to come
Financial Times - January 6 2010
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/54cc3b20-fa62-11de-beed-00144feab49a.html
Martin Wolf

What would have happened during the financial crisis if the euro had not existed? The short answer is that there would have been currency crises among its members. The currencies of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain would surely have fallen sharply against the old D-Mark. That is the outcome the creators of the eurozone wished to avoid. They have been successful. But, if the exchange rate cannot adjust, something else must instead. That “something else” is the economies of peripheral eurozone member countries. They are locked into competitive disinflation against Germany, the world’s foremost exporter of very high-quality manufactures. I wish them luck.
[...]
Where does that leave peripheral countries today? In structural recession, is the answer. At some point, they have to slash fiscal deficits. Without monetary or exchange rate offsets, that seems sure to worsen the recession already caused by the collapse in their bubble-fuelled private spending. Worse, in the boom years, these countries lost competitiveness within the eurozone. That was also inherent in the system. The interest rates set by the European Central Bank, aimed at balancing supply and demand in the zone, were too low for bubble-fuelled countries. With inflation in sectors producing non-tradeables relatively high, real interest rates were also relatively low in these countries. A loss of external competitiveness and strong domestic demand expanded external deficits. These generated the demand needed by core countries with excess capacity. To add insult to injury, since the core country is highly competitive globally and the eurozone has a robust external position and a sound currency, the euro itself has soared in value.

This leaves peripheral countries in a trap: they cannot readily generate an external surplus; they cannot easily restart private sector borrowing; and they cannot easily sustain present fiscal deficits. Mass emigration would be a possibility, but surely not a recommendation. Mass immigration of wealthy foreigners, to live in now-cheap properties, would be far better. Yet, at worst, a lengthy slump might be needed to grind out a reduction in nominal prices and wages. Ireland seems to have accepted such a future. Spain and Greece have not. Moreover, the affected country would also suffer debt deflation: with falling nominal prices and wages, the real burden of debt denominated in euros will rise. A wave of defaults - private and even public - threaten.

The crisis in the eurozone’s periphery is not an accident: it is inherent in the system. The weaker members have to find an escape from the trap they are in. They will receive little help: the zone has no willing spender of last resort; and the euro itself is also very strong. But they must succeed. When the eurozone was created, a huge literature emerged on whether it was an optimal currency union. We know now it was not. We are about to find out whether this matters.

Are we about to see the end of the much-vaunted eurozone?
The Observer - Sunday 3 January 2010
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jan/03/peter-oborne-end-of-eurozone
Peter Oborne
In putting financial considerations before social ones, the governments of Europe have ensured that things can only get worse

It is nearly 20 years since the Conservative chancellor of the exchequer Norman Lamont made his notorious remark that unemployment was a “price worth paying” for the restoration of economic stability. Lamont was at once condemned for his comments, made at the height of Britain’s ill-fated membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism. The progressive left universally denounced him as arrogant, brutal and out of touch. And yet, only two decades later, the European left has made the identical calculation. The imposition of the euro, and the rigid economic policy a single currency implies, is having socially catastrophic effects across much of Europe on a scale that dwarfs Britain’s suffering in the 1990s.

Consider the facts. In Spain, unemployment has already reached a gut-wrenching 19.3%. But unemployment for those between 16-24 is a catastrophic 42%. In Greece, youth unemployment is 25%, in Ireland 28.4% and Italy 26.9%. Marginal eurozone countries such as Greece, Spain and Ireland are not just in recession. They are in depression – and so long as they remain inside the euro there is no exit.

Before their decision to abandon economic sovereignty and sign up to the euro, policymakers had a tried and tested response to the kind of global setback of the last two years – depreciate the currency and loosen fiscal and monetary policy[…] But inside the euro, individual countries are stripped of the ability to manage their own economies. That is why the global recession has been far, far more devastating for some eurozone members than would otherwise have been the case – in just the same way that membership of the ERM inflicted wholly unnecessary damage on the British economy in the early 1990s.

The European single currency amounts to an experiment in social and economic engineering on a scale only very rarely before encountered in world history. The great question is whether it will work. There is a universal belief among the European political and economic elite that the euro will continue, no matter how much damage it inflicts or how many jobs it costs.
[…]
I believe that this heartless analysis is mistaken, and that the eurozone will in due course collapse (as Karl Marx might well have remarked) under the weight of its own contradictions. Economically, the euro can be spotted a mile off: it is a classic bankers’ ramp. It is designed to do all the things that bankers have historically wanted: create efficient markets, drive down the cost of labour, impose price stability, eliminate trade barriers, confound national boundaries and maximise corporate profits. Bankers don’t care much about youth unemployment in Madrid or home repossessions in Lisbon or riots on the streets of Athens. They worry about the bottom line and the euro has been very good for the bottom line, with stock markets up by an obscene 50% over the last eight months.

Should we divorce the euro?
The Sunday Business Post - 10 January 2010
http://www.sbpost.ie/commentandanalysis/should-we-divorce-the-euro-46642.html
David McWilliams

Joining a currency union is the economic equivalent of a marriage. If a country decides to give up its currency and get into bed with another currency, it would seem ludicrous to entertain this move without being sure that the union was suitable. As we all know, there is a difference between fancying someone and making the thing last.

To avoid single currency arrangements going sour, there is also a ‘matchmaker’ in economic theory. The economic matchmaker goes by the typically incomprehensible name of the ‘optimal currency area theory’. This theory is a checklist of economic attributes which need to line up in order for a monetary union to work.

For a currency union to work for a country, the most important thing is that the country trades overwhelmingly with the other members of the monetary union.

This ensures that all the countries in the union move roughly in the same economic cycle. It is also important that the structures of the respective economies are broadly similar, so that one country doesn’t experience a huge boom, while the rest are just motoring along nicely.

Having similar structures in banking and housing, for example, will imply that a country should not suffer a monumental bust, while the others are merely experiencing a normal recession. Equally, it is important that there is significant movement of people within the currency union - like there is in the US between its states - so that, if a country does slump, its citizens can move to find work in another member country.

In general, for a currency union to work, there should also be a single fiscal policy so that, when one area of the currency slumps, the rest of the union’s taxes go some way to ease the problems in the region in difficulty. This is how the currency unions in the US, Canada and Australia work.

Guess what? None of these attributes was in place when Ireland joined the EU economic and monetary union (EMU) and the euro. So it is clear that we didn’t join for economic reasons. So why did we join? It seems that we were too insecure to behave logically and this national insecurity - particularly among our senior mandarins - prevented us from having a debate.
[…]
The reason we should ask these questions is that it is clear the euro has been a disaster for Ireland, and will ensure our slump lasts considerably longer than it has to. When we look at other countries, we see that, of the three entrants into the then EEC in 1973,we are the only ones using the euro. However, we trade less with other eurozone countries than either Denmark or Britain.

The Irish Credit Bubble
University College Dublin Centre for Economic Research Working Papers Series - WP09/32 - December 2009
http://www.ucd.ie/t4cms/wp09.32.pdf
Google Cache (Web Page)
Morgan Kelly

While NAMA is intended to repair, for now, the damage to the asset side of Irish bank balance sheets from developer loans, their liability side appears unsustainable. The aggressive expansion of Irish bank lending was funded mostly in international wholesale markets, where Irish banks were able to borrow at low rates. From being almost entirely funded by domestic deposits in 1997, by 2008 over half of Irish bank lending was funded by wholesale borrowers through bonds and inter-bank borrowing. This well of easy credit has now run dry. In the words of Bank of England Governor Mervyn King: “But the age of innocence—when banks lent to each other unsecured for three months or longer at only a slight premium to expected policy rates—will not quickly, or ever, return.” As foreign lenders have become nervous of Irish banks, their place has increasingly been taken by borrowing from the European Central Bank and short-term borrowing in the inter-bank market. Payments from NAMA will allow Irish banks to reduce their borrowing by a trivial amount.

Without continued government guarantees of their borrowing and, more problematically, continued ECB forbearance, the operations of the Irish banks do not appear viable.
[...]
By pushing itself close to, and quite possibly beyond, the limits of its fiscal capacity, the Irish state has succeeded in rescuing Irish banks from their losses on developer loans. Despite this, these banks remain as zombies entirely reliant on continued Irish government guarantees and ECB forbearance, and committed solely to reducing their own debts.

While bank capital levels are, probably, adequate for the markedly smaller scale of their future lending, we will see below that even fairly modest losses on their mortgage portfolios will be sufficient to wipe out most or all of that capital. Having exhausted its resources in rescuing the Irish banks from the first wave of developer losses, the Irish state can do nothing but watch as the second wave of mortgage defaults sweeps in and drowns them. In other words, it is starting to appear that the Irish banking system is too big to save. As mortgage losses crystallise, the Irish government’s ill conceived project of insulating bank bond-holders from any losses on their investments is sliding beyond the means of its taxpayers.

The mounting losses of its banking system are facing the Irish state with a stark choice. It can attempt a NAMA II for mortgage losses that will end in a bond market strike or a sovereign default. Or it can, probably with the assistance of the IMF and EU, organise a resolution that shares property losses with bank creditors through a partial debt for equity swap. It is easy for governments everywhere to forget that their states are not wholly controlled subsidiaries of their banks but separate entities; and a resolution that transfers bank losses from the Irish taxpayer to bank bond holders will leave Ireland with a low level of debt that, even after several years of deficits, it can easily afford.

EUROFACTS … 30 November 2009

LISBON TREATY COMES INTO FORCE TODAY, TUESDAY

The Lisbon Treaty, which has 99% the same legal effect as the EU Constitution that was rejected by French and Dutch voters in 2005, comes into force on tomorrow, 1 December.

The European Union Act 2009 was published at the end of October. This Act implements the second Lisbon Treaty referendum result by amending the European Communities Act 1972 which has made European law applicable in the State up to now. The new Act makes the laws, acts and measures of the European Union “established by virtue of the Lisbon Treaty” part of the domestic law of the State.

This is a constitutionally different European Union from what we call the European Union at present, which was established by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, although its name is the same. This post-Lisbon EU replaces the European Community which Ireland joined in 1973 and which made supranational  European laws up to now, and takes over all its powers and institutions. From Tuesday therefore we will all be endowed with an additional citizenship to our Irish citizenship - a real EU citizenship with associated rights and duties, something quite different in its implications to the purely notional or symbolical EU citizenship that we are assumed  to have possessed up to now.

The article below explains the constitutional revolution in the EU and its Member States which has been brought about by the Lisbon Treaty and which will formally culminate on Tuesday.  This is something that scarcely figured in what passed for “debate” on the Lisbon Treaty in our Lisbon Two referendum. The  statutory Referendum Commission completely failed to explain the constitutional significance of Lisbon to Irish citizen-voters, even though that was its prime duty under the  Referendum Act establishing it - something the Government and Yes-side interests must be very grateful for.

PEOPLE’S MOVEMENT PICKET ON DAIL … TUESDAY 1-1.30 P.M.

The People’s Movement, whose chairman is former MEP Patricia McKenna, will protest against the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the undemocratic manner in which it was pushed through, in Ireland and across the EU,  for half an hour outside Dail Eireann in Kildare Street from 1 to 1.30 p.m. today,  Tuesday.    Interested people are invited to come along with appropriate posters, slogans etc.

LADY CATHERINE ASHTON, BARONESS ASHTON OF UPHOLLAND

Baroness Catherine Ashton is the new EU “Foreign Minister” under the Lisbon Treaty - properly titled “The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”.  The Irish media have so far been remarkably reluctant to give this lady her proper title. The Irish Times refers to her as “Ms Ashton”.  Is it not curious, this reluctance to give a member of the House of Lords, which the Baroness remains, her proper designation?

Baroness Ashton will receive an annual salary of  €350,000 and have a chauffeured car, a housing allowance and a staff of 20. She will have control of the new EU External Action Service, starting with 5000 staff already engaged  on “external relations”, based on EU delegations in 130 countries - and the service is expected to grow rapidly.  Current EU foreign policy boss Javier Solana  has said the service would become “the biggest diplomatic service in the world”. It is estimated to cost some ¤50 billion between now and 2013.

This EU foreign service is not open to democratic scrutiny, is likely to develop a life of its own and come to undermine the foreign policies of EU Member States.

The Sunday Times has noted that staff in overseas EU offices typically work a 4-day week, are entitled to first-class travel to and from their posting, as well as private health insurance and an allowance of up to £1,700 a month to spend on school fees.

EU COMMISSION  TO “LOOK AT” DIRECT EU TAXES

Agence France Presse reports that in a question-time session in the European Parliamen a week ago, European Commission President Jose Barroso said he would look at the idea of raising direct EU taxation.  Asked if he agreed with Herman Van Rompuy, the new EU President, that there should be EU taxes, he said: “I intend to look at all issues of taxation in the EU. We have to look at this, we have to look at all resources of the EU.  We have promised it to the Parliament, the programme with which I was elected was to look at possible ‘own resources’ and this is in the programme that was adopted by this European Parliament.”

EUROPEAN COUNCIL PRESIDENT VAN ROMPUY AN ARCH FEDERALIST

Herman Van Rompuy, 62,  has said that he favoured the Lisbon Treaty as long as it promoted the aim of “more Europe”. He helped to draw up a strongly Euro-federalist manifesto for his Flemish Christian Democrat Party, calling for more EU power. It said: “Apart from the euro, other national symbols need to be replaced by European symbols - licence plates, identity cards, presence of more EU flags, one-time EU sports events.”

Speaking  a fortnight ago at a private dinner organised by EU-federalist members of the Bilderberg Group  at the Chateau de Val-Duchesse, where the EU’s founding Treaty of Rome was negotiated in 1957, Mr Van Rompuy backed plans for “green taxes” to fund the EU. He said: “The possibilities of financial levies at European level must be seriously examined, and for the first time large countries in the Union are open to that.”

Article 311 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which governs the means of raising money to finance the EU,  provides under an amendment made by the Lisbon Treaty that the EU Council of Ministers “may establish new categories of own resources or abolish an existing category”,  and the new EU President was referring to that.

Pieter Van Cleppe, of the think-tank Open Europe, commented: “Van Rompuy is your typical EU federalist. He isn’t going to step on anyone’s toes or try to dominate the world like Tony Blair or President Sarkozy might have. But he can be relied upon to quietly make sure that the EU gets more and more powers, with less and less say for voters.”

The new EU President will earn €350,000 a year, taxed at 25 percent, and will have a staff of 22 press officers, assistants and administrators, in addition to 10 security agents.  This is double the salary he had as Belgian Prime Minister and  is significantly more than US President Barack Obama’s salary, which is around $400,000 a year or €269,000. The total cost of the President and his team will be ¤6 million a year.

LISBON’S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION BY STEALTH

by Anthony Coughlan

With the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty on Tuesday 1 December, members of the European Parliament, who up to now have been “representatives of the peoples of the States brought together in the Community” (Art.189 TEC),  become “representatives of the Union’s citizens” (Art.14 TEU).

This change in the status of MEPs is but one illustration of the constitutional revolution being brought about by the Lisbon Treaty.

For Lisbon, like the EU Constitution before it, establishes for the first time a European Union which is constitutionally separate from and superior to its Member States, just as the USA is separate from and superior to its 50 constituent states or as Federal Germany is in relation to its Länder.

The 27 EU members thereby lose their character as true sovereign States. Constitutionally, they become more like regional states in a multinational Federation, although they still retain some of the trappings of their former sovereignty. Simultaneously, 500 million Europeans becomes real citizens of the constitutionally new post-Lisbon European Union, with real citizens’ rights and duties with regard to this EU, as compared with the merely notional or symbolical EU citizenship they are assumed to have possessed up to now.

Most Europeans are unaware of these astonishing changes, for two reasons.  One is that, with the exception of the Irish, they have been denied any chance of learning about and debating them in national referendums. The other is that the terms “European Union”, “EU citizen” and “EU citizenship” remain the same before and after Lisbon, although Lisbon changes their constitutional content fundamentally.

The Lisbon Treaty therefore is a constitutional revolution by stealth.

The EU Constitution, which the peoples of France and Holland rejected in 2005, sought to establish a new European Union in the constitutional form of a Federation directly. Its first article stated: “This Constitution establishes the European Union”. That would clearly have been a European Union with a different constitutional basis from the EU that had been set up by the Maastricht Treaty 13 years before.

Lisbon brings a constitutionally new Union into being indirectly rather than directly, by amending the two existing European Treaties instead of replacing them entirely, as the earlier Constitutional Treaty had sought to do. Thus Lisbon states: “The Union shall be founded on the present Treaty” - viz. the Treaty on European Union (TEU) -”and on the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union.” These two Treaties together then become the Constitution of the post-Lisbon European Union. A new Union is in effect being “constituted”, although the word “Constitution” is not used.

What we called the “European Union” pre-Lisbon is the descriptive term for the totality of legal relations between its 27 Member States and their peoples. This encompassed the European Community, which had legal personality, made supranational European laws and had various State-like features, as well as the Member States cooperating together on the basis of retained sovereignty in foreign policy and defence and in crime and justice matters.

Lisbon changes this situation fundamentally by giving the post-Lisbon Union the constitutional form of a true supranational Federation, in other words a State. The EU would still lack some powers of a fully developed Federation, the most obvious one being the power to force its Member States to go to war against their will. It would possess most of the powers of a State however, although it has nothing like the tax and spending levels of its constituent Member States.

Three steps to a federal-style Constitution

Lisbon’s constitutional revolution takes place in three interconnected steps:

Firstly, the Treaty establishes a European Union with legal personality and a fully independent corporate existence in all Union areas for the first time (Arts.1 and 47 TEU). This enables the post-Lisbon Union to function as a State vis-a-vis other States externally, and in relation to its own citizens internally

Secondly, Lisbon abolishes the European Community which goes back to the Treaty of Rome and which makes European laws at present, and transfers the Community’s powers and institutions to the new Union, so that it is the post-Lisbon Union, not the Community, which will make supranational European laws henceforth (Art.1 TEU).  Lisbon also transfers to the EU the “intergovernmental” powers over crime, justice and home affairs, as well as foreign policy and security, which at present are not covered by European law-making, leaving only aspects of the Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy outside the scope of its supranational powers. The Treaty thereby give a unified constitutional structure to the post-Lisbon Union.

Thirdly, Lisbon then makes 500 million Europeans into real citizens of the new Federal-style Union which the Treaty establishes (Arts.9 TEU and 20 TFEU). Instead  of EU citizenship “complementing” national citizenship,  as under the present Maastricht Treaty-based EU (Art.17 TEC), which makes such citizenship essentially symbolical, Lisbon provides that EU citizenship shall be “additional to” national citizenship.

This is a real dual citizenship - not of two different States, but of two different levels of one State. One can only be a citizen of a State and all States must have citizens. Dual citizenship like that provided for in Lisbon is normal in classical Federations which have been established from the bottom up by constituent states surrendering their sovereignty to a superior federal entity, in contrast to federations that have come into being “top-down”, as it were, as a result of unitary states adopting federal form.  Examples of the former are the USA, 19th Century Germany, Switzerland, Canada, Australia. Lisbon would confer a threefold citizenship on citizens of Federal Germany’s Länder.

Being a citizen means that one must obey the law and give loyalty to the authority of the State one is a citizen of - in the case of classical Federations, of the two state levels, the federal and the regional or provincial. In the post-Lisbon EU the rights and duties attaching to citizenship of the Union will be superior to those attaching to one’s national citizenship in any case of conflict between the two, because of the superiority of Union law over national law and Constitutions (Declaration No 17 concerning Primacy).

The EU will be constitutionally superior even though the powers of the new Union come from its Member States in accordance with the “principle of conferral” (Art.5 TEU). Where else after all could it get its powers from?  This is so even though the Member States retain their national Constitutions and their citizens keep their national citizenships. The local states of the USA retain their different state Constitutions and citizenships, even though both are subordinate to the US Federal Constitution in any case of conflict between the two. The tenth amendment to the US Constitution alludes to the principle of conferral when it lays down that powers not delegated to the US Federation “are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people“.

Likewise,  it is not unusual for the Constitutions of classical Federations to provide for a right of withdrawal for their constituent states, just as the Lisbon Treaty does (Art.50 TEU). The existence of these features in the Constitution of the post-Lisbon Union does not take away from its federal character.

An alternative source of democratic legitimacy to the Nation State

Under Lisbon population size will in turn become the primary basis for EU law-making, as in any State with a common citizenry. This will happen after 2014, when the Treaty provision comes into force that EU laws will be made  by 55% of Member States as long as they represent 65% of the total population of the Union.

Lisbon provides an alternative source of democratic legitimacy which challenges the right of national governments to be the representatives of their electorates in the EU. The amended Treaty provides: “The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy. Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament. Member States are represented in the European Council by their Heads of State or Government and in the Council by their governments…” (Art.10 TEU).  Contrast this with what is stated to be the foundation of the present Mastricht Treaty-based EU (Art.6 TEU): “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.”

The constitutional structure of the post-Lisbon EU is completed by the provision  which turns the European Council of Prime Ministers and Presidents into an “institution” of the new Union (Art.13 TEU), so that its acts or its failing to act would, like those of the other Union institutions, be subject to legal review by the EU Court of Justice.

Constitutionally speaking, the summit meetings  of the European Council will henceforth no longer be “intergovernmental” gatherings outside supranational European structures, as they have been up to now.  The European Council will in effect be the Cabinet Government of the post-Lisbon Union. Its individual members will be constitutionally obliged to represent the Union to their Member States as well as their Member States to the Union, with the former function imposing primacy of obligation in any case of conflict or tension between the two.

One doubts if all the Heads of State or Government who make up the European Council themselves appreciate this!

As regards the State authority of the post-Lisbon Union, this will be embodied in the Union’s own executive, legislative and judicial institutions: the European Council, Council of Ministers, Commission, Parliament and Court of Justice.  It will be embodied also in the Member States and their authorities as they implement and apply EU law and interpret and apply national law in conformity with Union law. Member States will be constitutionally required to do this under the Lisbon Treaty. Thus EU “State authorities” as represented for example by EU soldiers and policemen patrolling our streets in EU uniforms, will not be needed as such.

Although the Lisbon Treaty has given the EU a Federal-style Constitution without most people noticing, they are bound to find out in time and react against what is being done. There is no European people or demos which could give democratic legitimacy to the institutions the Lisbon Treaty establishes and make people identify with these as they do with the institutions of their home countries. This is the core problem of the  EU integration project. Lisbon in effect has made the EU’s democratic deficit much worse.
It is hard to imagine that this will not make struggles to reestablish national independence and democracy and to repatriate supranational powers back to the Member States the central issue of EU politics in the years and decades ahead.

N.B. Although the above are major constitutional changes by any standard, both for the EU and its Member States,  Ireland’s Referendum Commission, under its chairman Mr Justice Frank Clarke, made absolutely no attempt to explain them or convey their significance to citizens in the Lisbon Two referendum in October. This was despite the fact that the Referendum Commission’s prime statutory duty under the Referendum Act was to explain to citizens how the proposed Lisbon constitutional amendment would affect the Irish Constitution.  The Referendum Commissioners were thereby guilty of a profound constitutional delinquency, for which the Government must surely be very grateful.

Anthony Coughlan is Director of the National Platform EU Research and Information Centre, Dublin, and President of the Foundation for EU Democracy, Brussels.

OPEN EUROPE’S 50 NEW EXAMPLES OF HOW THE EU BUDGET IS WASTED

The EU’s accountants - the European Court of Auditors (ECA) -  published their annual report on the EU’s budget in early November. The ECA refused to give the EU’s accounts a clean bill of health for the 15th year in a row, owing to fraud and mismanagement in the budget. Like last year however, the auditors did sign off the Commission’s own accounts, saying that they accurately represented how much money was raised and spent.

Although the ECA’s report is about the management of the accounts, the occasion represents an opportunity to take a closer look at the EU budget as a whole. Because while mismanagement of the accounts continues to be problematic, even when EU payments are deemed “clean” they are often still hugely wasteful. This is because the process underpinning how money is spent encourages poor project selection.

National governments are handed a pot of money that has to be spent, regardless of whether there’s a real need or demand for a certain type of project. As a result, EU-funded projects easily become expensive solutions to invented problems. The complexity and needless centralisation of these budget programmes means that taxpayers are not getting value for their money.
To illustrate this, Open Europe has produced a light-hearted list of 50 new examples of EU waste. The list is by no means comprehensive, but designed to show the types of peculiar projects on which EU money has been wasted in the past. They include:

• An art education project called “Donkeypedia”, in which a donkey travelled through the Netherlands to meet and greet primary school children, which was part of the EU’s €7 million ‘Year of Intercultural Dialogue’ initiative.
• An EU grant worth 800,000 Swedish kronor (€80,000), given to Sweden’s third largest city, Malmo, in 2008 to create a virtual version of itself in “Second Life” - a virtual fantasy world inhabited by computer-generated residents.
• €400,000 to get children drawing portraits of each other in the name of European citizenship.
• €198,500 for an EU puppet theatre network in the Baltics.

To read Open Europe’s 50 new examples of EU waste in full, see here:

www.openeurope.org.uk/research/top50waste.pdf

Not the will of the people, but the fear of the people, has led a majority of Irish voters to approve ratifying the Lisbon Treaty in yesterday’s re-run referendum.

Ireland’s voters voted not on the content of Lisbon but on membership of the EU, on fear of political isolation if they did not say Yes to the same Treaty as they said No to last year, and on the promise of jobs and economic recovery which the Yes-side bullied and bamboozled them into believing was they would get if they only voted Yes.

Thus the bankrupt Irish political Establishment, which has ruined its country’s economy, has opted through stupidity and fear to clamp an undemocratic Constitution on itself and most of Europe.

This year the Republic of Ireland will suffer a decline of nearly one-tenth in its economic output; it will have a Budget deficit equivalent to 12% of GDP, an unemployment rate of some 14% of its labour force and resumed net emigration from the country.

One accepts the result of the Lisbon re-run as a fact, but it is not a result that democrats need morally or politically to identify with or approve. This result does not have political legitimacy, whatever the voting percentages amount to, because of the fraudulent and undemocratic way in which the referendum was run, making it unique in these respects among the 30 or so referendums that have been held in Ireland since its Constitution was adopted in 1937.

With limitless money provided by the Brussels Commission, the political parties in the European Parliament, the Irish Government and private business firms, Ireland’s Yes-side forces easily outspent the Nos by at least ten to one in a referendum campaign which was unique in modern Irish history for its massive unlawfulness and breaches of the country’s referendum law.

There were at least six dimensions to this illegality:

1) The intervention of the European Commission, entailing massive expenditure of money to influence Irish opinion towards a Yes, the running of a web-site and the issuing of statements that sought to counter No-side arguments, and the adocacy of a Yes vote by Commission President Barroso and other Commissioners and their staffs during visits to Ireland. This is unlawful under European law, as the Commission has no function in relation to the ratification of new Treaties, something that is exclusively a matter for the Member States under their own constitutional procedures;

2.) The part funding of the posters and press advertising of most of Ireland’s Yes-side political parties by their sister parties in the European Parliament, even though it is illegal under Irish law to receive donations from sources outside the country in a referendum and even though, under European law, money provided by the European Parliament to cross-national political parties is supposed to be confined to informational-type material and to avoid partisan advocacy;

3) The Irish Government’s unlawful use of public funds in circulating to voters a postcard with details of the so-called “assurances” of the European Council, followed by a brochure some time later containing a tendentious summary of the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, as well as other material - steps that were in breach of the 1995 Irish Supreme Court judgement in McKenna that it is unconstitutional of the Government to use public funds to seek to obtain a particular result in a referendum;

4) The failure of the country’s statutory Referendum Commission to carry out its function under the Referendum Act that established it of explaining to citizens how the proposed constitutional amendment and its text would affect the Irish Constitution. Instead the Commission’s Chairman, Judge Frank Clarke, turned the Commission into an arm of Government propaganda, while the judge indulged himself in various “solo-runs” on radio and in the newspapers, giving several erroneous explanations of provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, even though this was quite beyond his powers under the Act;

5) Huge expenditure of money by private companies such as Intel and Ryanair to advocate a Yes vote, without any statutory limit, in possible breach of Irish company and tax law, and undoubtedly constituting a major democratic abuse.

6) Breaches by the Irish broadcast media of their obligation under the Broadcasting Acts to be fair to all interests concerned in their coverage of issues of public controversy and debate. Newstalk 106, owned by Mr Denis O’Brien, a committed supporter of the Yes side, was quite shameless in its partisanship on its current affairs programmes.

Democrats across Europe will now hope that the brave President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus, will hold back Czech ratification of the Treaty until the constitutional challenge that has been launched there is completed and there is a change of Government in Britain by next May. In that way the promise of a referendum made to the British people in the Labour Party’s Election Manifesto may yet be fulfilled under the Conservatives - something that would give our fellow countrymen and women in Northern Ireland a chance of voting on this EU Constitution.

In June the German Constitutional Court laid down that the basic principles of democracy required that there should be parliamentary control of how Government Ministers from the EU Member States exercised various implementing powers under the Lisbon Treaty - for example the “simplified revision procedure” of Article 48 TEU whereby policy areas can be shifted from unanimity to majority voting without need of new Treaties or referendums.

Germany instituted such parliamentary controls in September. Ireland has done so in the Constitutional Amendment people voted for yesterday. Similar parliamentary controls should now be sought through Court actions in as many EU countries as possible in the interest of defending what is left of democracy in Europe.

If Lisbon however should go through and come into force for all 27 States, giving the post-Lisbon EU the constitutional form of a Federation and turning 500 million people into real EU citizens for the first time without their being asked, that is bound to make the question of national independence and democracy the main issue of European politics for years and possibly decades to come - not least in Ireland, whose modern political history has been largely a struggle against the drawbacks of its people being made citizens of another country.

The Lisbon Two referendum has exposed the moral and political bankruptcy of Ireland’s main political parties. There is a vacuum in Irish politics, as there is in many other EU countries, when all the “Establishment” political parties line up on one side and so many of the country’s citizens are on the other.

Across Europe huge numbers of citizens are not being properly represented by those who have been elected to represent them. The coming period in history will see many attempts to fill this political vacuum, in Ireland and elsewhere.

Below for your information is a copy of the  letter that was delivered to Mr Justice Frank Clarke, Chairman of the Referendum Commission, from Anthony Coughlan last Thursday, with the most relevant passages highlighted in bold …

☛ Continue reading Open Letter to the Referendum Commission

JENS-PETER BONDE
(EUObserver/Comment)
24 July 2009

The German Constitutional Court issued a remarkable verdict on 30 June. It was described in the press as the Court’s approval of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.

However, careful reading of the judgement shows that it is a fundamental rejection of the core constitutional content of the Treaty.

The Court judgement modifies the most important principle of the primacy of European law. Member States are said to be the “masters of the Treaties.” In the Court’s view the EU institutions have no powers of their own. They can only administer delegated competences in prescribed areas. European law is stated to be ultimately based on and limited by the accession law of each Member State.

The German Court implicitly invites any citizen, political party or business firm in Germany to take court cases before the German Constitutional Court if they find that a piece of proposed EU law is outside those delegated competences. Then it is the German Court that will decide - not the EU Court.

This is a rejection of Art. 344 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which provides that Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than the European Court of Justice.

The Karlsruhe Court also insists that there must be important areas of law-making and decision-taking left to the EU Member States. This is an invitation to politicians everywhere to ask their governments what competences are left with the Member States after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty.

I have offered a bottle of top class wine to anyone who can give me just one example of a national law which cannot be touched in some way by the Lisbon Treaty. Legal specialists have tried to find examples; yet they cannot!

If EU governments cannot find room for the exercise of meaningful national parliamentary democracy within the ambit of the EU, then the Lisbon Treaty is unconstitutional, according to the German Court.

The Court does not accept that the European Parliament is a body which can give adequate democratic legitimacy to European Union law. The Court also sets limits to the importance of the new “additional” Union citizenship and states that this can only be supplementary to national citizenship.

The Court insists on national parliamentary participation in all areas where Member States would lose their right of veto.

The judges unanimously insist, by 8 votes to nil, on prior approval by the German Parliament - and implicitly by other National Parliaments - for the use of the so-called “bridge articles” whereby Government Ministers on the Council of Ministers or the European Council can alter EU law-making from unanimity to qualified majority voting.

The judges also require full participation of National Parliaments in the use of the flexibility clause in Art. 352 TFEU, which permits the EU to take action and adopt measures to attain one of the EU’s objectives even if the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers.

Finally, the Court forbids the German President from signing the Treaty so as to enable Germany’s instrument of ratification to be deposited in Rome until the German Parliament has adopted a law which would safeguard the involvement of the German Bundestag and Bundesrat in future EU decision-making.

The most striking element in the judgement is that the Court implies the need for the involvement of National Parliaments in all aspects of EU law-making. They refer to democracy as being a principle common to all the EU Member States. The involvement of National Parliaments in EU law-making is therefore a necessity. If not, the principle of democracy will have been fundamentally breached.

Recognising the democratic deficit

The Karlsruhe Court effectively finds that the Lisbon Treaty would increase the EU’s widely acknowledged democratic deficit if its ratification is not linked to the adoption of internal procedures at Member State level such as to safeguard the involvement of the National Parliaments and voters in each Member State.

The verdict applies only to Germany, of course. But it has significant implications for all Member States, including those which have already approved and ratified the Lisbon Treaty.

With this Court judgement in hand, political parties and groups of citizens in each Member State are implicitly invited to go to their National Parliaments and insist on similar guarantees being given in order to ensure the involvement of elected representatives and voters in EU decision-making in each one.

If Germany’s ratification of the Lisbon Treaty is found to be illegal and in contravention of basic democratic principles in the absence of such parliamentary controls, should not the same principle apply in all other Member States that claim to be democracies?

The Karlsruhe judgement should inspire people to call for similar constitutional and parliamentary challenges in other EU countries. This may establish strengthened procedures for national parliamentary control and safeguard areas where national parliamentary democracies can decide things on their own without interference from, for example, the EU Court of Justice.

Such calls may also win time to make people aware of the anti-democratic character of the Lisbon Treaty and ensure that this is not ratified by all EU States before it has been approved by Irish voters in their referendum re-run on 2 October next, and can be put later before British voters in a referendum in the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom must have a general election before June next year. The Conservative Party, which is likely to win that election, has pledged to withdraw the United Kingdom’s ratification of the Lisbon Treaty on its first day in office if the Treaty has not come into force by then for all 27 EU States. It has then pledged to hold a referendum on it and to recommend a No vote to the British people.

There needs to be a democratic review of the Lisbon Treaty in all EU countries before any such encounter with UK voters.

Excerpts from the German Constitutional Court judgement in the English version published by the Court, 30 June 2009.

“European unification on the basis of a union of sovereign states under the Treaties may not be realised in such a way that the Member States do not retain sufficient room for the political formation of the economic, cultural and social circumstances of life.” (Headnotes to the Judgement, Par. 3)

“It is therefore constitutionally required not to agree dynamic treaty provisions with a blanket character or if they can still be interpreted in a manner that respects national responsibility for integration, to establish, at any rate, suitable national safeguards for the effective exercise of such responsibility.” (Par.239)

“European unification on the basis of a union of sovereign states under the Treaties may not be realised in such a way that the Member States do not retain sufficient space for the political formation of the economic, cultural and social circumstances of life. This applies in particular to areas which shape the citizens’ circumstances of life, in particular the private space of their own responsibility and of political and social security, which is protected by the fundamental rights, and to political decisions that particularly depend on previous understanding as regards culture, history and language and which unfold in discourses in the space of a political public that is organised by party politics and Parliament. Essential areas of democratic formative action comprise, inter alia, citizenship. the civil and military monopoly on the use of force, revenue and expenditure including external financing and all elements of encroachment that are decisive for the realisation of fundamental rights, above all as regards intensive encroachments on fundamental rights such as the deprivation of liberty in the administration of criminal law or the placement in an institution. These important areas also include cultural issues such as the disposition of language, the shaping of circumstances concerning the family and education, the ordering of the freedom of opinion, of the press and of association and the dealing with the profession of faith or ideology.” (Par. 249)

“Consequently, the Treaty of Lisbon does not alter the fact that the Bundestag as the body of representation of the German people is the focal point of an interweaved democratic system.” (Par. 277)

“… the European Parliament is not a body of representation of a sovereign European people.” (Par.280)

“The deficit of European public authority that exists when measured against requirements on democracy in states cannot be compensated by other provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon and to that extent, it cannot be justified.” (Par.289)

“As regards the legal situation according to the Treaty of Lisbon, this consideration confirms that without democratically originating in the Member States, the action of the European Union lacks a sufficient basis of legitimisation.” (Par.297)

“Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon does not vest the European Union with provisions that provide the European union of integration (Integrationsverband) with the competence to decide its own competence (Kompetenz-Kompetenz).” (Par.322)

“With Declaration No.17 Concerning Primacy annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, the Federal Republic of Germany does not recognise an absolute primacy of application of Union law, which would be constitutionally objectionable, but merely confirms the legal situation as it has been interpreted by the Federal Constitutional Court. . .” (Par. 331)

“After the realisation of the principle of the sovereignty of the people in Europe, only the peoples of the Member States can dispose of their respective constituent powers and of the sovereignty of the state. Without the expressly declared will of the peoples, the elected bodies are not competent to create a new subject of legitimisation, or to delegitimise the existing ones, in the constitutional areas of their states.” (Par. 347)

The Lisbon Treaty Re-run - 13 Key Facts

On Friday 2 October we will be voting on exactly the same Lisbon Treaty as Irish voters rejected last year. Not a dot or comma of it will have been changed. These are the main things Lisbon would lead to:

1. A RADICAL SHIFT OF CONTROL TO THE BIG STATES OVER THE EU: Lisbon would halve Ireland’s vote in making EU laws from 2% to 0.9%, while doubling Germany’s vote to 16% and increasing the vote of France, Britain and Italy from 8% each to 12% each. Lisbon would thereby base EU law-making in future on exact population size, just as in a single unified State.

At present EU laws are made on the basis of a “double majority” system - a simple majority of the 27 EU States (14 or more), as long as between them they have a weighted majority of 255 out of a total of 345 votes (Art.205 TEC*; Declaration on Enlargement). Under this system the Big States have 29 votes each and Ireland has 7.

Under Lisbon EU laws would be made by a majority of States (at least 55%, 15 or more), as long as they have 65% of the total EU population between them (Art.16 TEU). This change would double Germany’s voting power in making EU laws from its present 8% to 16%, increase Britain’s, France’s and Italy’s from their present 8% each to 12% each, while halving Ireland’s vote from 2% to 0.9% on the latest official EU population figures for 2009.

Instead of the Big States having 4 times Ireland’s voting weight, as now, under Lisbon Germany would have 18 times and France, Britain and Italy 15 times each. The Government’s White Paper writes untruthfully when it speaks of the “change to a double majority voting system in the Council” (p.44). A double majority of States and weighted votes already exists for making EU laws. What Lisbon does is to replace the existing system of weighted votes, which already recognises the larger size of the Big States, by exact population size as the key criterion for future EU law-making - so hugely advantaging the Big EU States at the expense of the small.

The Big Four EU States would between them have half the voting power on the EU Council of Ministers under the post-Lisbon voting rules, as compared with one-third of the weighted votes they have at present.

The new Lisbon-based voting system would also make it much easier for Germany, France and the Brussels Commission to impose sanctions on Ireland, up to and including limitless fines, under the rules of the Eurozone if we fail to get our 12%-of-GDP budget deficit down to the 3% target level for the Eurozone, according to whatever time-limit they should decide.

At present a special majority of two-thirds of the weighted votes of the Eurozone countries is needed to impose an enforcement procedure and sanctions on Eurozone countries that are running excessive budget deficits (Arts.104 and 122 TEC). Under Lisbon, 8 of the 16 Eurozone States, excluding the delinquent State (viz. 55% of the 16), could impose sanctions on a country running what they decide is an excessive deficit - as long as they have 65% of the 300 million Eurozone population between them. The State with the excessive deficit does not have a vote (Arts.126 and 238 TFEU; Protocol No.12 on the Excessive Deficit Procedure). Germany and France between them have nearly half the population of the Eurozone.

If we ratify Lisbon we will thereby be creating an iron rod to be laid across our backs by Germany, France and the Brussels Commission with regard to our budget deficits and general Government finances over the crucial next few years.

2. LOSING THE RIGHT TO DECIDE IRELAND’S COMMISSIONER: Lisbon would abolish our present right to “propose” and decide who Ireland’s Commissioner is (Art 214 TEC), by replacing it with a right to make”suggestions” only, for the incoming Commission President and the Big States to decide (Art.17.7 TEU).

The EU Prime Ministers have promised each State a Commissioner for the time being, but what is the point of us continuing to have an Irish Commissioner post-Lisbon when the Irish Government can no longer decide who that person would be? The Government White Paper makes no mention of this shift from a bottom-up to a top-down appointment process of deciding the members of the Commission.

This change in the mode of deciding on EU Commissioners is the reason why the Big Four EU States were willing to consider losing their own national Commissioner for five years out of every 15 under Lisbon, because they knew that they would have the decisive say in appointing all the other Commissioners through the incoming Commission President, whom they would have the key role in appointing.

Under Nice we can continue to have a permanent Commissioner on a 26-plus-one basis, as Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt recently suggested, and Ireland would continue, moreover, to decide who he or she will be. Under Nice we also have a veto on any change in the number of Commissioners. Under Lisbon we have no such veto.

3. GIVING THE EU THE CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF A STATE: Lisbon would abolish the European Community which Ireland joined in 1973 and replace it with a legally new European Union in the constitutional form of an EU Federation. This post-Lisbon EU would for the first time be legally fully separate from and superior to its 27 Member States, would sign international treaties with other States in all areas of its powers and would make half or more of our laws each year (Arts.1 and 47 TEU; Declaration 17 concerning Primacy). This is quite evident also from the second sentence of the Irish Constitutional Amendment which is set out in the 28th Amendment of the Constitution Bill, and can be ontained free from Post Offices, Garda stations and Libraries.

In constitutional terms Lisbon would thereby turn Ireland into a regional or provincial state within this new Federal-style European Union, with the EU’s Constitution and laws having legal primacy over the Irish Constitution and laws in any cases of conflict between the two. Ireland would thus formally cease to be a sovereign independent State in its own right in the international community of States, and become like a provincial state inside an EU Federation.

One illustration of the constitutional revolution which Lisbon would bring about is that it would make MEPs, who under the current treaties are “representatives of the peoples of the States brought together in the Community” (Art.189 TEC), into “representatives of the Union’s citizens” (Art.14 TEU).

4. MAKING US INTO REAL EU CITIZENS, WITH CITIZENS’ RIGHTS AND DUTIES VIS-A-VIS THE POST-LISBON EUROPEAN UNION WHICH WOULD HAVE PRIMACY OVER OUR RIGHTS AND DUTIES AS IRISH CITIZENS: Lisbon would confer on us an “additional” citizenship of the constitutionally Federal post-Lisbon European Union, owing obedience to its laws and loyalty to its authority over and above our duty of obedience and loyalty to Ireland and the Irish Constitution and laws in the event of any conflict between the two (Art.9 TEU).

This would be quite different from the notional or symbolic EU citizenship that people speak of today, because Lisbon would transfer the law-making powers of the European Community to the constitutionally new Union which Lisbon would establish, and the Community would be then legally abolished. As real EU citizens for the first time, we would be subject to the refounded Union’s laws and would be expected to give our citizens’ loyalty to the authority of the constitutionally new post-Lisbon Union.

One can only be a citizen of a State and all States must have citizens. The Irish people were not that happy when they were citizens of the UK State from 1800 to 1921. Although as citizens of the post-Lisbon Federal EU we would still keep our Irish citizenship, this would be subordinate to our EU citizenship and to the rights and duties attaching to that in any cases of conflict between the two (Art.9 TEU; Declaration 17 concerning Primacy).

5. THE EU COURT OF JUSTICE WOULD DECIDE OUR RIGHTS AS EU CITIZENS: Lisbon would give the EU Court of Justice the power to decide our human rights by making the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding for the first time (Art.6 TEU). This would give power to the EU judges to lay down a uniform standard of rights for the 500 million citizens of the post-Lisbon Union in the name of their common EU citizenship in the years and decades to come.

This would open the possibility of clashes with national human rights standards in sensitive areas where Member States differ from one another at present, e.g. inheritance and property rights, trial by jury, the presumption of innocence, habeas corpus, legalising hard drugs, abortion, euthanasia, labour law, marriage law, children’s rights etc. Ireland’s Supreme Court and the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights would no longer have the final say on what our fundamental rights are.

6. ABOLISHING THE NATIONAL VETO: Lisbon would abolish the national veto which Ireland has at present in over 30 new policy areas by handing over to the EU the power to make laws binding on us as regards public services, crime, justice, policing, immigration, energy, transport, tourism, sport, culture, public health, the EU budget, international moves on climate change etc.

7. REDUCING THE POWER OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS: Lisbon would reduce the power of National Parliaments to decide 49 policy areas or matters by shifting their powers to the EU, and increase the influence of the European Parliament in making EU laws in 19 new areas (See euabc.eu for the two lists).

8. A “SELF-AMENDING” TREATY: Lisbon could be regarded as a self-amending Treaty in that it would permit the EU Prime Ministers and Presidents to shift most remaining EU policy areas where unanimity is required and a national veto still exists - for example on tax harmonisation - to qualified majority voting on the EU Council of Ministers, without the need of further EU Treaties or referendums (Art.48 TEU).

Lisbon would also extend the so-called “Flexibility Clause”, which allows the EU to take action and adopt measures to attain one of the EU’s objectives even if “the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers‘”, to all areas of the Treaty and not just the internal market rules as at present (Art.352 TFEU). This would open the floodgates to more political integration, viz. centralisation, by means of this article, which is already widely used.

9. GIVING THE EU ITS OWN TAXES: Lisbon would permit the post-Lisbon EU to impose its own EU-wide taxes directly on us for the first time, on top of national taxes, in order to raise its “own resources” for the EU itself, without the need of further EU Treaties or referendums (Art.311 TFEU). This would have to be unanimously agreed by the Prime Ministers and Presidents, but seeing how they can agree unanimously to push through Lisbon, they should have no problem in agreeing EU taxes in due time to finance all the extra functions which the post-Lisbon Union would exercise.

10. A RACE TO THE BOTTOM IN PAY: Lisbon would copperfasten the Laval, Rüffert and related judgements of the EU Court of Justice, which put the competition rules of the EU market above the right of trade unions to enforce pay standards higher than the minimum for migrant workers. At the same time Lisbon would give the EU full control of immigration policy (Art.79 TFEU).

11. FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND HARMONISING TAXES: Lisbon would amend the existing treaties to give the EU exclusive power as regards rules on foreign direct investment(Arts.206-7 TFEU). It would give the EU Court of Justice the power to order the harmonisation of national indirect taxes if it judges that these cause a “distortion of competition” (Art.113 TFEU, Protocol 27 on the Internal Market and Competition). These steps could threaten Ireland’s 12.5% company profits tax, which is the principal incentive that attracts foreign companies to Ireland and keeps them here when they come.

12. A NON-ELECTED EU PRESIDENT: The Treaty would enable the 27 EU Prime Ministers to appoint an EU President for up to five years without allowing voters any say as to who he or she would be, thereby abolishing the present six-month rotating EU presidencies (Art.15 TEU).

13. NEUTRALITY AND A MORE MILITARIZED EU: Lisbon would militarize the EU further by requiring Member States “progressively to improve their military capabilities” (Art.42.3 TEU) and to aid and assist other Member States experiencing armed attack “by all the means in their power” (Art.42.7 TEU).

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*TEC= European Community Treaty; TEU = Treaty on European Union as amended by the Lisbon Treaty; TFEU = Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as amended by the Lisbon Treaty. These two amended Treaties together would become the Constitution of the new post-Lisbon European Union.

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Facts on the Lisbon Treaty

Millions of Europeans support us: By voting No we remain full members of the EU and of the euro currency based on the existing Nice Treaty, but we reject the proposed Lisbon Treaty as a step too far. Millions of  our fellow Europeans who are being denied referendums on Lisbon by their politicians are hoping that we will say No again for their sakes. We can thereby open the way for a better Treaty for a better and more democratic Europe.
☛ Continue reading ☘Explanatory document on Lisbon

The  Dáil and Seanad should insist on  parliamentary control over the Taoiseach and Government Ministers in exercising the self-amending powers of the Lisbon Treaty, just as the German Constitutional Court requires the German Parliament to do.
☛ Continue reading ⚠Irish Dáil should not have inferior powers to the German Parliament in controlling Irish Government Ministers when exercising the Lisbon Treaty’s self-amending powers

Below for your information is a news item received from  Open Europe, London,  on the German Constitutional Court’s  decision of this morning on the Lisbon Treaty.

Appended to this post is an ☛on-site link to the Constitutional Court’s  decision  in English.

It seems that the  Constitutional  Court is saying that Germany, at least , must ensure that their parliament - both houses - participates in major EU decisions.

The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung  says the Constitutional Court ruling is demanding a law to guarantee the rights of the German Parliament in the EU decision-making process.

If that is so, should not Oireachtas Eireann have a law requiring this too - and Westminster and Paris and Prague and Bucharest, and 22 others?

Should  not all EU National  Parliaments also have  “participation in European lawmaking procedures”?
☛ Continue reading ☘Lisbon Treaty News: German Constitutional Court delays Germany’s ratification of the Lisbon Treaty